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Colloquium
GENDER, LAW AND HEALTH CARE
NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR TEACHING AND
SCHOLARSHIP: THE ROLE OF GENDER IN
LAW AND HEALTH CARE
KAREN

H.

ROTHENBERG*

For the last two years, I have focused on gender issues in the seminar I teach on law and biomedical sciences. My primary goal in the
seminar has been to combine a basic exploration of the major themes
in law and biomedical sciences with an examination of related gender
issues. Although I did not consider myself versed in feminist legal
theory, I had been working on a number of women's health issues and
found a lack of attention to gender in health care law. This introductory essay will discuss how and why I decided to teach this seminar and
will review the pedagogical decisions I made in choosing topics and
materials. Finally, it will introduce the four student-written Comments that follow and attempt to place them in the context of the
themes and objectives of the seminar, as well as within an analytical
framework informed by feminist legal perspectives.
It has been eleven years since I taught my first seminar on law and
biomedical sciences. The seminar began as a survey of such issues as
informed consent, medical experimentation, reproductive technologies, and death and dying. For guidance, I used a casebook,' but I
quickly became frustrated by how limited I was by this approach and
by how many "supplemental materials" were needed to make the
course complete. The issues were so diverse and constantly changing
as a result of new discoveries and technologies that it was difficult to
get a handle on the priorities and most current developments. It also
seemed that there were so many issues to cover that there was no time
* Marjorie Cook Professor of Law and Director, Law and Health Care Program, University of Maryland School of Law. B.A., 1973, Princeton University; M.P.A., 1974, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University; J.D., 1979,
University of Virginia. I would like to thank my colleague,Jana Singer, for her insights and

suggestions on this essay and for sharing with me her perspectives on feminist legal theory.
Of course, I would also like to thank all my hard-working seminar students who inspired
me to write this essay and to pursue new approaches to teaching and scholarship.
1.

JUDITH AREEN ET AL., LAw, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE

(1984 & SupP.).
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to delve into the connections among issues with any depth. After several years, I decided to focus on AIDS as a paradigm to explore issues
in law and biomedical sciences. It was my hope that by narrowing the
focus of the seminar to the study of AIDS, legal and policy issues could
be studied in a context in which students could apply theory to "real
world" issues. More specifically, the seminar examined the impact of
AIDS on the rights and obligations of health care workers, including
the obligation to treat, testing issues such as informed consent, and
the rights and obligations of infected health care workers. To ensure
interdisciplinary thinking, I invited students from the Schools of Nursing, Medicine, Dentistry, and Pharmacy to join the law students in developing policy papers on these issues, rather than requiring the
traditional legal research and writings projects.'
Using the AIDS paradigm convinced me that concentrating on a
particular focus was an effective way of teaching this course. Students
were able to see the connections between such issues as informed consent for testing and informed consent for treatment; and between
moral duties to treat and legal rights to practice. In each case, the
connections had a context to ground their analysis. Thus, in developing my next seminar, I chose another lens through which students
could consider the complex legal and ethical issues involved in health
care-the lens of gender. Although I taught only law students in this
seminar, I wanted to cultivate the same type of interdisciplinary thinking that I had seen in the AIDS seminar. Thus, I chose reading materials for the seminar from a broad array of sources including medical,
scientific and psychological journals, newspapers, as well as the more
traditional law review articles, cases, and regulations.'
The seminar was designed to progress from the general to the
specific analysis of complex health care policy and gender issues. The
seminar began with an introduction to gender discrimination in
health care and to feminist bioethics. 4 Although I did not place labels
2. See Comments, The AIDS Project: Creating a Public Health Policy-Rights and Obligations of Health Care Workers, 48 MD.L. REv. 95 (1989).
3. Because of the lack of attention to gender-related issues in law and medicine
casebooks, the seminar required the development of course materials from a variety of
sources. I would like to thank Leslie Bender for her inspiration and insights discussed in
Teaching FeministPerspectiveson Health CareEthics and Law: A Review Essay, 61 U. CIN. L. REv.
1251 (1993). I also wish to thank Vicki Michel, Pat Peppin, Susan Wolfe and Rebecca
Dresser who shared with me their ideas and course materials.
4. Course materials included: Campaign for Women's Health, A Challenge for the
1990's: Improving Health Carefor American Women (1991); Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs, American Medical Association, Gender Disparities in Clinical Decisionmaking, 266
JAMA 559 (1991); NATIONAL INsTrrurrs OF HEALTH, Executive Summary, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL INSTrTTEs OF HEALTH: OPPORTUNITIES FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN'S HEALTH 7
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on approaches to feminist .legal theory, I began to introduce the students to the diversity of feminist legal perspectives. 5 We discussed, for
example, ways that the medical establishment has contributed to gender bias, and the need to evaluate ethical (and legal) dilemmas in a
contextualized way, looking at the particular details and relationships
involved in a problem situation rather than mechanically applying abstract principles.6 As Susan Sherwin argues in No Longer Patient, "An
important task of feminist ethics is to reshape the problem and offer
alternative models for medical relationships that neither replace patient authority with technical expertise nor abandon patients to their
'rights,' where that amounts to granting them the opportunity to assert their independent authority in a hostile, frightening environment."7 Throughout the seminar, we tried to meet Sherwin's
challenge to develop a "richer, nondichotomous account of proper
decision-making in health care,"8 not limited to the choice between
paternalism and autonomy.
With this brief introduction in place, we examined the patient/
provider relationship.9 The study of this relationship laid the founda(1991); SUSAN SHERWIN, Toward a Feminist Ethics of Health Car

in No LONGER PATIENT

(1992); Virginia L. Warren, Feminist Directions in Medical Ethics, 4 HYPATIA 73 (1989).
5. See also infra notes 20-28 and accompanying text for discussion of feminist legal
perspectives. See generally FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY- FOUNDATIONS (D. Kelly Weisberg ed.,
1993); FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY. READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER (Katharine T. Bartlett &

Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991); Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender Law, 1 DuE J. GENDER L. &
POL'Y 1 (1994); Patricia Cain, FeministJurisprudence: Groundingthe Theories, 4 BERKELEY WoMEN'S LJ. 199 (1989); Patricia Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REv. 803
(1990).
6. SHERWIN, supra note 4, at 77.
7. Id at 140.
8. Id.
9. Course materials included: Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902 (Cal. 1980); Sard v.
Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977); SUSAN SHERWIN, Paternalism, in No LONGER
PATIENT 137 (1992); Alexandra Dundas Todd, The Diseasingof Reproduction: When the Patient
is a Woman, in INTIMATE ADVERSAMEs: CULTURAL CONFLICT BETWEEN DocTORS AND WOMEN

PATIENTS (1989); Dorothy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher, EthicalDecision Making in Medical
Genetics: Women as Patients and Practitioners in Eighteen Nations, in HEALING TECHNOLOGY.
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 221 (Kathryn Ratcliff ed., 1989); E.J. Emanuel & L.L. Emanuel, Four
Models of the Physician-PatientRelationship, 267 JAMA 2221 (1992); Peter Franks & Carolyn
M. Clancy, Physician Gender Bias in Clinical Decisionmaking: Screening For Cancer in Primary
Care, 31 MEDicAL CARE 213 (1993); Bernadine Healy, The Yentl Syndrome, 325 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 274 (1991).
Recommended readings included: Crosscutting Science Working
Group, Cardiovascular Function and Disease, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF
HEALTH: OPPORTUNITIES FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN'S HEALTH (1991); Emily Martin, Medical
Metaphors of Women's Bodies: Menstruation and Menopause, in THE WOMAN IN THE BODY 27

(1991); SUSAN SHERWIN, Ascriptions ofIllness, in No LONGER PATIENT 179 (1992); Alfredo
Morabia et al., The Influence of Patient and Physician Gender on Prescription of Psychotropic
Drugs, 45J. CLINIcAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 111 (1992); Richard M. Steingart et al., Sex Differences in
the Management of Coronary Artery Disease, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 226 (1991).
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tion for the more specific applications of theory to practice in the
weeks to come. We first considered the effect of the long tradition of
paternalism, and the issues raised by the apparent alternative-a
"masculine version" of patient autonomy and informed consent.1"
Following a discussion of different models of informed consent and
empirical data on gender differences in physician/patient communication, we examined case law that raised the "real life" applications of
informed consent theory. Hopefully, students were now sensitized to
the difficulty of generalizing roles and behaviors for both patients and
providers.
We next examined death and dying issues as an extension of our
informed consent analysis.'" We first studied the landmark Cruzan
case12 and the Supreme Court's lack of commitment to family decision-making. We also considered research by Miles and August'3 on
gender bias in right-to-die cases indicating that courts are less likely to
respect a woman's choice regarding her death than a man's choice,
even when her decisions have been clearly expressed. The undervaluing of women's needs and gender difference was then considered in
the context of clinical research.' 4 We were able to evaluate the trend
10. SHERWIN, supra note 4, at 140 ("After all, patients often are at a disadvantage in
medical contexts: when they are ill, they are likely to be frightened of abandonment, and
they may not be confident about their own judgment; hence, they may not be eager to
insist on their rights to independentjudgment. Individual authority is not necessarily their
preferred alternative under such circumstances.").
11. Course materials included: Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -618 (1994); Leslie Bender, A Feminist
Analysis of Physician-Assisted Dying and Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 59 TENN. L. REv. 519
(1992); G.E. Dickinson & R.E. Tournier, A LongitudinalStudy of Sex Differences in How Physicians Relate to DyingPatients,48J. AM. MED. WOMEN'S Ass'N 19 (1993); B.J. Logue, Taking
Charge: Death Controlas an Emergent Women's Issue, 17 WOMEN & HEALTH 97 (1991); Stephen
H. Miles & Allison August, Courts, Gender and the Right to Die, 18 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE
85 (1990); Susan M. Wolf, Nancy Beth Cruzan: In No Voice at All HASTINGs CENTER REP. 38
(1990); Abigail Trafford, Assisted Suicide's Apparent Gender Gap, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1993, at
26.
12. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
13. Miles & August, supra note 11, at 85.
14. Course materials included: The National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of
1993, 42 U.S.C. § 289a-2 (Supp. V 1993); SUSAN SHERWIN, Research, in No LONGER PATIENT
158 (1992); Marcia Angell, Caringfor Women's Health-What is the Problem?, 329 NEW ENG.J.
MED. 271 (1993); Board of Health Sciences Policy of the Institute of Medicine, Inclusion of
Women in Clinical Trials-Policiesfor PopulationSubgroups, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 288 (1993);
L. Elizabeth Bowles, The Disenfranchisementof Fertile Women in Clinical Studies: The Legal
Ramifications of and Solutions for Rectifying the Knowledge Gap, 45 VAND. L. REv. 877 (1992);
Rebecca Dresser, Wanted: Single, White Male for Medical Research, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 24
(1992); Ruth B. Merkatz et al., Women in Clinical Trials of New Drugs, 329 NEW ENG.J. MED.

292 (1993); Tracey L. Johnson & Elizabeth Fee, Women's Participationin Clinical Research:
From Protectionismto Access (June 30, 1993) (background paper for the Institute of Medicine
Committee on the Legal and Ethical Issues Relating to the Inclusion of Women in Clinical
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from excluding "vulnerable" women from research based on protectionism, to including women based on the view that both the quality
of the research and women themselves stand to benefit from
inclusion.
The seminar then turned its attention to reproductive technologies1 5 and pregnancy control 6 to further develop a specific context
for examining the evolution of health care policy and its impact on
women. We noted that on the surface, these issues illustrate the diversity of feminists' perspectives, including whether to promote the auStudies, on file with the author). Recommended readings included: J.H. Gurwitz et al.,
The Exclusion of the Elderly and Women From Clinical Trials in Acute MyocardialInfarction, 268
JAMA 1417 (1992); Sandra D. Cassard, Health Consequences of Exclusion or Underrepresentation
of Women in Clinical Studies (May 10, 1993) (paper prepared for the Institute of Medicine
Committee on the Legal and Ethical Issues Relating to the Inclusion of Women in Clinical
Studies, on file with the author).
The Institute of Medicine Committee on the Legal and Ethical Issues Relating to the
Inclusion of Women in Clinical Studies completed its project and published a book on
women and clinical research that could be substituted for many of the materials listed
above. 1 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH (Anna Mastroianni et al.
eds., 1994). The Executive Summary and Legal Considerations chapters may be especially
useful.
15. Course materials included: In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (NJ. 1988); Johnson v.
Calvert, 871 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); SusAN
SHERwIN, New Reproductive Technologies, in No LONGER PATIENT 117 (1992); Ellen Wright
Clayton, A Ray of Light About Frozen Embryos, 2 KENNEDY INST. ETmics J. 347 (1993); Paul
Lauritzen, What Price Parenthood?, H sTINGs CENTER REP. 38 (1990); Janice G. Raymond,
Reproductive Gifts and Gift Giving- The Altruistic Woman, HASTINGS CENTER REP,. 7 (1990);
Karen H. Rothenberg, GestationalSurrogacy and the Health Care Provider: Put Partof the IVW"
Genie Back into the Bottle, 18 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 345 (1990); Marjorie Maguire
Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-BasedParenthood: An Opportunityfor GenderNeutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297-316, 372-98 (1990). Recommended readings included: J.C. Shattuck & ILK. Schwartz, Walking the Line Between Feminism and Infertility: Implications for
Nursing, Medicine, and Patient Care, 12 HE.ATH CARE FOR WOMEN INT'L 331 (1991); Ellen
Hopkins, Tales from the Baby Factoy, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 15, 1992, § 6 (Magazine) at 40.
16. Course materials included: In reA.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990); Elaine W. v.Joint
Diseases N. Gen. Hosp., 613 N.E.2d 523 (N.Y. 1993); Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., CourtOrdered ObstetricalInterventions, 316 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1192 (1987); Thomas B. MacKenzie &
Theodore C. Nagel, and Barbara Katz Rothman, When a Pregnant Woman Endangers Her
Fetus, HAsmcs CrErrER REP. 24 (Feb. 1986) (commentaries); Dorothy Roberts, Punishing
DrugAddicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L.
REv. 1419 (1991); Elyse R. Rosenblum, The Irony of Norplant, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 275
(1992); Michael Dorris, A Desperate Crack Legacy, NEwswEFI, June 25, 1990, at 8; Tamar
Lewin, Implanted Birth ControlDevice Renews Debate Over Forced Contraception,N.Y. TtMEs, Jan.
10, 1991, at A20; Baltimore Norplant Policy materials (1993); Policy on Decision-Making
with Pregnant Patients at the George Washington University Hospital (1990). Recommended materials included: Andrea Goetze, Court-Ordered Caesarean Sections: Probing the
Wound, I TEX.J. WOMEN & L. 59 (1992); Abby Lippman, PrenatalGenetic Testing and Screening ConstructingNeeds andEnforcingInequities (The Human Genome Initiativeand the Impact of
Genetic Testing and Screening Technologies) 17 AM.J.L. & MED. 15 (1991); Dorothy C. Wertz &
John C. Fletcher, Sex Selection Through PrenatalDiagnosis: A Feminist Citique, in FEMINIS
PERsPEcrIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICs 240 (Helen B. Holmes & Laura M. Purdy eds., 1992).
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tonomy of women or to seek to protect women from exploitation. It
soon became clear, however, that this purported dichotomy did not
fully capture the complex issues, and a more flexible approach to feminist positions was needed. Following our general study of pregnancy
control, we considered these issues in the context of women and
AIDS, focusing on the limits to reproductive choice.1 7 We also considered how current public health strategies have focused on a male
model, in that the threat of domestic violence, for example, may limit
a woman's participation in partner notification and in condom negotiation, the two major public health strategies currently employed in
the fight against AIDS.
Finally, we applied the major themes developed in the seminar in
the context of breast cancer and breast implants. 18 This context al17. Course materials included: Doe v. Jamaica Hosp., 608 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1994);

CEN-

TERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Facts About Women & HIV/AIDS, HIV/AIDS
PREVENTION 1 (Feb. 1993); CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Female Adult/
Adolescent AIDS Cases by Exposure Category and Race/Ethnicity, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE RE-

PORT (May 1993); UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, YOUNG WOMEN: SILENCE,
SuSCEPTiBILrY AND THE HIV EPIDEMIC (Summer 1993); John D. Aras, AIDS and Reproductive Decisions: Having Children in Fearand Trembling, 68 MILnANK Q. 353 (1990); Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 1993 Revised Classification System for HIV Infection and Expanded Surveillance Case Definition for AIDS Among Adolescents and Adults, 41 MORBIDITY &
MORTALrIY WKLv. REP. 1 (1992); Cecilia Leonardo &Joan C. Chrisler, Women and Sexually
Transmitted Diseases, 18 WOMEN & HEALTH 1 (1992); Carol Levine, Women & HIV/AIDS
Research: The Barriers to Equity 13 IRB, 18 (Jan.-Apr. 1991); Carol Levine et al., Building a
New Consensus: Ethical Principles and Policiesfor Clinical Research on HIV/AIDS, 13 IRB, 1
(Jan.-Apr. 1991); Carol Levine & Nancy Neveloff Dubler, UncertainRisks and BitterRealities:
The Reproductive Choices ofHIV-Infected Women, 68 MILBANK Q. 321 (1990); Karen H. Rothenberg & Richard L. North, The Duty to Warn 'Dilemma' and Women with AIDS, 2 COURTS,
HEALTH SCIENCE & THE LAw 90 (1991); Ellie E. Schoenbaum & Mayris P. Webber, The
Underrecognitionof HIV Infection in Women in an Inner-City Emergency Room, 83 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 363 (1993). Recommended readings included: Kathryn Carovono, More Than
Mothers and Whores: Redefining the AIDS Prevention Needs of Women, 21 INT'LJ. HEALTH SERV-

131 (1991).
18. Course materials included: Chudson v. Ratra, 76 Md. App. 753, 548 A.2d 172

ICES

(1988); Butler v. Mentor, Breast Implant Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publications) 1795 (June 11,

1993) (complaint); Marcia Angell, BreastImplants-Protectionor Paternalism?,326 NEW

ENG.

J. MED. 1695 (1992); Jack C. Fisher, The Silicone Controversy-When Will Science Prevail?,326
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1696 (1992); Marcia F. Goldsmith, Image of Perfection Once the Goal-Now
Some Women Just Seek Damages, 267 JAMA 2439 (1992); David A. Kessler, The Basis of the
]DA's Decision on Breast Implants, 326 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1713 (1992); H.M. Thornton, Breast
Cancer Trials: A Patient's Viewpoint, 339 LANCET 44 (1992); Sandra G. Boodman, Fear of
Breast Cancer,WASH. PosT,Jan. 5, 1993, at Z1O; Susan Ferraro, The Anguished Politicsof Breast
Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1993, § 6 (Magazine) at 25; Ellen Joan Pollock, Breast-Cancer
Diagnosis Suits are Increasing,WALL ST. J., July 22, 1993, at BI; Elizabeth Rosenthal, Study
Questions Breast Removal, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1993, at A18; ONCOLOGIC DRUGS ADVISORY
COMMrrTEE, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,

Tamoxifen Prevention Trial (1993).

NATIONAL WOMEN'S HEALTH NETWORK,

Recommended materials included:

Marianne H.

Whatley & Nancy Worcester, The Role of Technology in the Co-optation of the Women's Health
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lowed us to examine the role of body image in our society and its
manifestations in the law, as well as the diversity of feminist perspectives to policy approaches in the area. We reviewed the historical failure of the research community to investigate the cause and cure for
breast cancer. We also considered both the tort system's failure to
adequately address damages for women injured both physically and
emotionally by breast implants, and regulatory approaches which permit, for example, silicone breast implants for reconstructive, post-mastectomy surgery but not for cosmetic purposes.
Throughout the seminar, I relied heavily on student participation
and required significant, original research on a paper topic. By the
ninth week of class, the students had completed a first draft of their
seminar paper. For the remainder of the semester, students with similar topics were grouped together to develop their class presentations
and design supporting reading materials. Students were asked to design presentations that were not mere outlines of the written paper,
but instead pedagogical exercises that would force the rest of the class
to focus on a significant legal, ethical, or policy issue raised by the
presenter. For example, students developed ethics committee case
studies regarding reproductive choices for women with HIV, administered questionnaires on the use of egg donation, and videotaped interviews of women of different generations talking about their life
choices and decisions about death. Other students shared draft legislation on issues such as surrogacy and advance directives. These exercises were not only instructive for the rest of the class, but also for the
presenting student who was able to gain some feedback and integrate
the experience into her or his paper. This approach also provided an
opportunity to expand significantly the number of topics studied in
the seminar. 19

Movement: The Cases of Osteoporosis and Breast Cancer Screening, in HEALING TECHNOLOGY.
FEMINIST PERSPECMIVES 199 (Kathryn Strother Ratcliff ed., 1989); Phillip J. Camponella,
Breast Cancer, Staging, Treatment, and the Duty to Inform, 35 MEDICAL TRIAL TECHNIQUE Q. 17
(1988); Bernard Fisher et al., Lumpectomy Compared With Lumpectomy and Radiation Therapy
for the Treatment of Intraductal Breast Cancer, 328 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1581 (1993).
19. Paper topics included the following: gender bias in the evolution of the Maryland
Health Care Decision Act; pregnancy clauses in living wills and advance health directives;
elderly women and medical decision making; surrogacy legislation; legal and ethical issues
regarding the sale of human ova; fetal tissue research; sexual harassment in medical
schools; Norplant use in public schools; linking entitlements to behavior of mother/women/parents; sterilization of the mentally retarded; legal implications of classifying PMS as
a mental disorder; analysis of state laws addressing genetic defects; prenatal genetic testing
& provider liability; liability of pharmaceutical companies for inclusion/exclusion of women in clinical trials; bone marrow therapy as a treatment for breast cancer; breast implant
litigation and regulation; and breast cancer litigation.
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Since first teaching the seminar in 1993, I have updated the readings in bioethics, medical literature, and the law. I have added a week
on women and genetics, focusing on the impact of genetic testing not
only in pregnancy but also on diseases that specifically affect women
such as breast and ovarian cancer. I continue to refine this seminar,
shifting some of the topics covered and integrating more feminist
legal theory. It is my hope that this introductory essay and the Comments that follow will stimulate new ideas and concerns for both
teaching and scholarship in this area. All four Comments are examples of the excellent hard work and commitment of my seminar students at the University of Maryland.
All four Comments reflect a number of important feminist
themes which we discussed throughout the seminar. Perhaps most
importantly, gender does matter in the context of both law and biomedical sciences. Feminist approaches seek to understand and to value the
experiences, insights, and logic of women's lives. Feminist legal theory provides us with a healthy skepticism toward traditional legal doctrine and insists that we re-examine even formally gender neutral
rules to uncover the assumptions behind them. Feminist theories also
challenge our traditional split between private and public spheres, as
well as the impact of public policy and reform on our sense of justice.
Finally, feminist perspectives value the importance of narrative,
thereby challenging the traditional "objectivity" of legal reporting of
case law. Stories put issues in context, just as case studies do for
ethicists and health care providers. Narratives allow us to challenge
the assumptions we make about individuals and the role of the law in
their lives.
These important themes are reflected in a diversity of feminist
legal theories.2 ° It is useful to outline briefly these feminist theories in
order to put the papers that follow in a broader analytical framework.
Although these legal perspectives were not explicitly labeled as such
throughout the seminar, they are clearly reflected, to varying degrees,
in each of the student's papers.
Liberal feminism is based on a belief in formal gender equality,
particularly in the economic and political arenas. 21 Since women possess the same capabilities as men, women should be entitled to equal
20. I have crafted the analytical framework for describing the major feminist theories
in part from the outstanding work of authors cited supra note 5.
21. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex and Unequal Protection: Men & Women as Victims,
I IJ. FAM. L. 347 (1971); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender & the Constitution,44 U. CIN. L. REv.
1 (1975); Wendy Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S Rrs. L. REP. 175 (1982).
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rights, equal employment opportunities, and equal pay. Under this
equality model, gender classifications are highly suspect because they
reflect and reinforce stereotypes that fail to treat men and women as
individuals, without regard to gender. Liberal feminism draws heavily
on the notions of rationality, individual autonomy and choice that are
central to liberal political theory. Liberal feminists have focused primarily on eliminating state imposed gender distinctions and on
preventing the state from limiting individual choice. While liberal
feminism has been quite successful in expanding political and economic opportunities available to white, middle class, women, it has
been criticized for ignoring the constraints of race and class and for
adopting an assimilation model that benefits women only if they acted
like men.
While liberal feminism emphasizes the essential sameness of men
and women, cultural or relational feminism focuses on their differences.2 2 Cultural feminism is grounded in the work of Carol Gilligan
and other contemporary psychologists who suggest that men and women speak in a "different voice."2 ' These theorists argue that men on
average tend to analyze problems in terms of abstract rules and competing rights and to emphasize the importance of autonomy. Women, by contrast, tend to be more contextual in their analysis of
problems and to place more emphasis on preserving personal relationships and on maintaining connections between and among individuals. Cultural feminists argue that many traditional legal doctrines
and practices ar based on male values of autonomy and abstraction
and fail to value the positive "feminine" concerns of responsibility, relationship, and essential connectedness experienced in the motherchild relationship. Many cultural feminists have sought to promote a
positive vision of a female ethic of care, rather than a morality of
rights. For example, cultural feminists have suggested that the law
look for alternatives to the traditional adversary paradigm including
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. In a similar view, they sug24
gest that courts apply a feminist ethic of care in negligence law.
Dominance or radical feminism also arose in large part in response to the perceived inadequacies in liberal feminist theory. Like
22. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in the Law, 15 VT. L. REv. 1 (1990); Robin West, Jurisprudenceand
Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. (1988).
23. CAROL GILLiGAN, IN A D-FERsxNT VoicE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
24. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Trimer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3
(1988).
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cultural feminists, Catherine MacKinnon, the major proponent of
dominance theory, argues that men and women are different, but that
these differences largely reflect the societal fact that women are
subordinate and men are dominant. 5 According to dominance theorists, it is this inequality in power to which the law must respond.
Moreover, since the primary source of women's oppression is private
power, particularly the threat of sexual violence, the solution is notas the liberal feminists often claim-less state intervention, but more.
Dominance feminists argue, for example, that the legal system should
abandon its traditional "hands-off' attitude toward violence in the
family and move more aggressively to protect women from abusive
power of men in the private sphere. These arguments have produced
some concrete legal changes. MacKinnon was instrumental in persuading law-makers to recognize workplace sexual harassment as prohibited sex-discrimination, not as just a private matter between
individuals.2 ' Thus, whereas liberal feminists have argued primarily
on expanding women's choices, and cultural feminists attempted to
reform legal rules to reflect women's real experiences and affirm women's values, radical feminists have argued that law should address
the harms to women that arise from conduct of other private actors,
particularly men, and particularly with respect to sex and violence.
Postmodern feminism rejects the assumptions and generalizations at the core of the other feminist theories. Since no objective
reality can describe the "essential" woman, postmodem feminists embrace the particular "situated" realities of all individual women.
Postmodernists encourage feminists to consider real life experiences
influenced by each woman's race, class, age, and sexual orientation.2 7
Critical legal feminist scholars have incorporated themes of
postmodernism by rejecting abstract universal theory and embracing
the need for a social policy that provides practical and just solutions to
real life problems.2 8
Abby Brandel's Comment considers the tensions among these
various feminist theories in the context of surrogacy. 29 Supporters ar25. CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
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(1987); see also Christine A. Littleton, FeministJurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 41
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gue that surrogacy is a reproductive choice that the state should not
limit, while critics contend that the state should prohibit surrogacy
because it is exploitative and degrading to women and society as a
whole. Brandel adopts primarily a liberal feminist position although
she is clearly influenced by the other feminist perspectives as well.
She argues that carefully drafted legislation would minimize the potentially exploitative aspects of surrogacy and preserve access to surrogacy as a reproductive choice. She also asserts that although
surrogacy poses serious potential problems, it is and will continue to
be used, and it is therefore wiser to attempt to minimize those
problems and provide for the best interests of children born of
surrogacy.
After describing the uncertain state of surrogacy law in Maryland,
Brandel proposes legislation as a partial solution, recognizing that no
legislation can prevent or resolve every situation, especially in an area
as complex and emotionally charged as surrogacy. She proposes that
surrogacy be available only to people with infertility, and that legislation abandon the "previous birth" requirement for surrogates adopted
by many states. Brandel argues for increased regulation of surrogacy
clinics, particularly in the way they report their "success" rates, to address the widespread statistical manipulation and deception that has
occurred. Brandel proposes mandatory judicial pre-approval of surrogacy contracts, and compensation for surrogates, within certain guidelines. She argues that surrogates should be responsible for all clinical
decision-making during the pregnancy, and that they be allowed a
short "grace period" after the birth to rescind their decision to renounce parental rights.
Brandel recognizes, however, that some of the issues raised by
surrogacy simply cannot be resolved satisfactorily by legislation; she
proposes non-legislative ways to minimize the potential harms in surrogacy. She suggests that preventing infertility should be a higher priority in medicine. She urges us to combat the cultural notion that
reproduction is a "biological imperative"" ° and that children are the
symbols of a "successful" union. Brandel also contends that we should
attempt to change the medical profession's focus on the technology of
medicine toward a more patient-centered ethic of care, particularly in
the context of female reproduction, which has historically been "overmedicalized" to the detriment of many women. Finally, she suggests
that we should revise the language of surrogacy, which includes terms
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like egg "harvesting" that tend to depersonalize and objectify both the
process and the participants.
Some of the same issues raised by the surrogacy debate are also
considered in Timothy Burch's Comment dealing with pregnancy
clauses in living will and advance health care directive statutes."'
Burch argues that pregnancy clauses, as presently written in mostjurisdictions, limit an incompetent pregnant woman's right to terminate
life support in violation of her common law and constitutional rights.
He also argues that these laws are bad policy and often make the state
of the law unclear.
Burch then argues for what he believes is a more realistic and
humane way of legislating in this area. He adopts primarily a cultural
or relational feminist position. He proposes legislation based upon a
"caring substituted judgment" paradigm. This approach would allow
a woman to decide, when drafting her directive, what should occur if
she were pregnant and incompetent by recognizing that her decision
is made in context, and allowing for that context to be legally recognized. For instance, a woman may not consider her individual rights
versus State power in such a situation, but may consider whether or
not she wants a child brought into the world without her and whether
or not her surviving family can cope with such a situation. As it now
stands, such considerations are often ignored by the law.
Burch sets up his paradigm by arguing that the traditional clash
between autonomy and beneficence is insufficient to evaluate the real
life circumstances and concerns of most people in our society. He
argues that the ethic of care enhances autonomy better then the justice paradigm because it recognizes that people are not equally empowered and that many relationships contain codependencies
between differentially empowered people. Furthermore, almost all
decisions are made with other people or effects in mind; Burch's approach allows for these considerations and people to be a part of any
final decision.
In fact, the ethic of care dovetails nicely with the doctrine of substituted judgment in allowing a woman's family and friends to be a
part of the decision-making process. Burch argues that throughout
life we seek the counsel of others and often make decisions based
upon their concerns. He then asks why, at the time of death, do we
try to isolate the individual from those support systems that they have
31. TimothyJ. Burch, Comment, Incubator orlndividual? The Legal and Policy Defiziencies
of Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will and Advance Health Care Directive Statutes, 54 MD. L. REv.
528 (1995).
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relied on throughout life. In response, Burch's model legislation
adopts a "caring substituted judgment" standard as the means to effectuate the interests of those involved without the state ordaining what
should occur, as it now does in most jurisdictions.
Lee Solomon's Comment shifts our attention to premenstrual
syndrome (PMS)."3 Nonetheless, her Comment is analogous to the
others in that it captures the diversity raised by feminist perspectives
and their impact on legal analysis. The official classification by the
American Psychiatric Association in its DSM-IV manual of a severe
form of premenstrual syndrome (called premenstrual dysphoric disorder (PMDD)) has caused controversy among feminists and women's
health activists because of the legal and societal implications of this
"disorder." The PMS defense used in various criminal trials, for example, will have a more solid foundation now that the syndrome is a
recognized illness in the field of psychiatry. Critics fear that this development will be the proverbial "double-edged sword": The classification lends credibility to symptoms which have long been ignored or
disbelieved by society and medical professionals, yet may also serve to
reinforce the cultural belief that menstruation is a disability and
makes women less fit for positions of power and responsibility.
Solomon initially discusses the myths, questions, and taboos
which have surrounded the menstrual cycle in all societies, cultures,
and religions, and the medical theories which have provided sexist
rationalizations for women's inferior social status. She then highlights
the many facets of the debate surrounding PMDD. Critics of the classification allege that there is insufficient empirical evidence to support the classification, and that without better evidence no woman
should be labeled as mentally ill. Furthermore, critics contend that
the classification is often subjective and leads to inconsistent diagnoses. Critics are also skeptical about establishing a psychiatric illness
related exclusively to hormonally linked symptoms found only in women, particularly since there is no parallel category for men.
Solomon then examines the implications of using PMS or PMDD
as a criminal defense strategy. She stresses that the classification of
PMDD as a recognized disorder in the DMS-IV will lessen the evidentiary and definitional problems that have been associated with this defense, and consequently lead to its increased usage, particularly in the
United States. Solomon cautions that the potential benefits of the defense must be weighed against its possible negative implications in em32. Lee Solomon, Comment, PremenstrualSyndrome: The Debate Surrounding CriminalDefense, 54 MD. L. REV. 571 (1995).
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ployment discrimination and custody cases. Thus, she struggles with
the tensions raised by adoption of liberal, cultural and radical feminism in different contexts of women's lives. Whereas she rejects liberal feminism in the criminal law context, she recognizes the negative
consequences of treating women differently in other areas of law.
Sex discrimination in another context is at issue in Kim Limbrick's Comment on the sexual harassment of female medical students.3 3 Due to the long history of male dominance and female
subservience in the field of medicine, women in medical school are at
an especially high risk of being harassed by their superiors and their
peers. This risk and the potential harm of harassment is especially
great in this arena because medical education and training for medical students is largely controlled by a few professors and supervising
physicians. Students are therefore unwilling to challenge persons who
wield so much control over their future careers, or believe that they
are incapable of stopping the harassment and accept it as an unfortunate consequence of choosing a career in medicine. Others simply do
not recognize the harassment as such because the male dominance is
so pervasive and institutionalized in the profession. Limbrick points
out that unreported harassment reinforces the perception that it does
not occur or that it is harmless, thereby creating a vicious cycle of
discrimination that not only robs women of the opportunity to enjoy
an educational experience equal to that of their male counterparts,
but also reinforces disrespect for women in the profession. Her attention to the effect of power imbalance in the medical profession reflects the perspective of dominance feminism.
The author proposes a two-part change in the analytical framework used by courts in evaluating Tide IX claims for sexual harassment. Limbrick relies primarily on the insights of cultural feminism
to craft her recommendations. First, she argues that courts should
evaluate the abusiveness of an environment from the perspective of a
reasonable woman rather than a reasonable person. This change
would force courts to recognize that men and women react differently
to harassing conduct. Second, she asserts that the abusiveness inquiry
should require no more than a finding that the harassment made the
student's studies more difficult, instead of the more onerous standard
currently required.
Limbrick also discusses a mechanism by which the medical school
could be held liable for students' harassment of their peers. Instead
33. Kimberly L. Limbrick, Comment, Developing a lable Cause of Action for Student Vwtims of Sexual Harassment: A Look at Medical Schools, 54 MD. L. REv. 601 (1995).
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of requiring proof of intentional discrimination on the part of the
institution, she argues that courts should evaluate the notoriety and
pervasiveness of peer harassment and should examine institutional efforts to curtail it. If the institution knew of or should have known of
the peer harassment and did not take sufficient action to stop it, it
should be held liable for neglecting its duty to prevent sex discrimination in violation of Title IX. Limbrick disagrees with the notion that
pursuing sexual harassment claims in court reinforces the stereotype
of the weak woman unable to fight her own battles, noting that making a harassment claim is in fact a courageous act. While acknowledging that the courtroom is not the ideal environment in which to iron
out any kind of discrimination issue, Limbrick contends that the cycle
of sexism in medicine will continue until a viable cause of action
against sexual harassment is available as one way of forcing change.
All four Comments address significant gender issues in health
care that are informed by the diversity of feminist perspectives. They
demonstrate that fruitful legal and policy analysis incorporate empirical research, feminist theory, and interdisciplinary approaches. Hopefully, this strategy for teaching and scholarship will increase our
understanding of the complexity of law and biomedical sciences in
our society.

